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6 I From Decentralization to 
Centralization: Members' 
Changing Expectations 
for House Leaders 
DANIEL J. PALAZZOLO 
Before the reforms of the 1970s, at least since the revolt against 
Speaker Joseph G. Cannon in 1910, party leaders of the House of Repre-
sentatives performed tasks designed to mediate party interests both within 
and outside of the House. Within the House, their most important functions 
included organizing the party, scheduling bills, building coalitions, distrib-
uting and collecting information, and maintaining party harmony (Ripley 
1967). Meanwhile, committee chairs exercised the most discretion over spe-
cific policy issues. Outside of the House, the Speaker acted as a mediator 
between the majority party and the, president, especially if the president was 
of the same party (Ripley 1969a). Again, however, presidents dealt directly 
with committee chairs on most policy matters. 
Jn the immediate aftermath of the 1970s budgetary reforms, party lead-
ers continued to concentrate on mediating functions within the House-
coalition building and party maintenance (Sinclair .1983). But as the post-
reform period extended into the 1980s, leaders began to perform policy-
oriented tasks both internal and external to the House. Internally, leaders 
participated in formulating the details of budget resolutions. Externally, 
they were called on to settle conference disputes with Senate leaders and to 
negotiate budget priorities with the president. 
How can the evolution toward policy-oriented leadership tasks in the 
postreform House be explained? This chapter argues that the answer lies 
in the expectations of House members (see Jones 1968; Rohde and Shepsle 
1987; Sinclair 1983), which can emanate from two sources. First, expec-
tations arise partly from individual members' electoral, political, and policy 
goals. Members expect leaders to help them attain such goals; leaders, in 
turn, work with their colleagues' objectives in mind. The other source of 
members' expectations is the context that shapes House politics (Cooper 
and Brady 1981; Jones 1981). Leaders not only respond to individual mem-
ber goals but also adapt their activities to institutional changes, electoral 
trends, partisan developments, and the policy agenda. This chapter con-
centrates primarily on this source of member expectations. 
In the current postreform era, leaders are expected to perform tasks 
aimed either at resolving institutional problems or advancing party prior-
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ities. In the decentralized House of the immediate postreform period, party 
leaders engaged in traditional leadership activities in response to problems 
within the House. But in the more centralized context of the 1980s, party 
leaders also took advantage of policy-related opportunities within the House 
and were expected to respond to demands coming from outside the insti-
tution. Consequently, their functions expanded to include policy formula-
tion and negotiation with outside actors, particularly Senate leaders and the 
president. To understand how party leaders adapted their activities to prob-
lems and opportunities as budget policy-making evolved from a decentral-
ized to a centralized context, a broad overview of the variat10ns in conditions 
of the postreform period is necessary. 
THE POSTREFORM CONTEXT 
The context surrounding party leaders' involvement in the budget process 
can be traced partly to the institutional reforms of the 1970s. These reforms 
were deliberate attempts to structure the formal organization and proce-
dures of the two chambers, the informal norms of members, and the re-
lationship between Congress and the president. In addition to institutional 
reforms, other conditions, both internal and external to the House, were 
the products of electoral results, partisan developments, and the policy 
agenda. These postreform institutional, political, and policy conditions ex-
pose the problems members expect House leaders to address and create the 
opportunities leaders may capitalize on. 
Taken together, the 1970s reforms lacked a clear and coherent pre-
scription for arranging decision-making power in the House. On the one 
hand, in order to topple powerful committee chairs and the entrenched 
seniority system, reformers further decentralized power by spreading it 
across subcommittees. On the other, reformers attempted to coordinate the 
committee system in order to centralize power in the party leadership. 
"Whereas earlier reform periods appeared to swing in one direction or the 
other-toward centralization or decentralization, responsibility or respon-
siveness-the elaborate changes enacted m the 1970s seemed to go in both 
directions at once," observed Charles 0. Jones (1981, 121). One of the 
objectives of the 1974 Budget Act, for example, was to create a budget 
process that could potentially integrate the separate appropriations, au-
thorization, and tax legislation into a coherent budget plan. Yet the new 
process maintained the traditional legislative powers of the tax-writing, 
appropriating, and authorizing committees. Reforms that broadened the 
Speaker's powers included a Steering and Policy Committee chaired by the 
Speaker (and including many members nominated by the Speaker), the 
power of multiple referral, and the prerogative to nominate members of the 
Rules Committee. 
To complicate further the decentralization-centralization paradox of the 
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reforms, Steven Smith (1989) suggests that the reforms actually pulled in 
three directions. He argues that some rule changes aimed at enhancing mem-
bers' legislative prerogatives buttressed a third center of power-the House 
floor. A substantial increase in floor amendments following the reforms 
indicated a "collegial" pattern of decision making that differed from a purely 
decentralized subcommittee arrangement. While a subcommittee system fea-
tures many actors deliberating on policy issues in many decision-making 
units, collegial decision making brings many participants together in only 
a few decision-making units. Thus, the House floor became a central forum 
for all members to participate in shaping legislation. 
Given the mixed intentions of the reforms, decision making in the post-
reform House could take several paths: centralized, decentralized, collegial, 
or some combination of the three. The bulk of the reforms clearly favored 
a subcommittee structure and encouraged members to participate actively 
on the floor. Consequently, the immediate effects of the reforms were ex-
hibited in either subcommittee government (Davidson 1981; Deering and 
Smith 1981) or collegial decision making (Smith 1989). Subcommittee gov-
ernment increased the number of places where policies originated, thereby 
limiting the interaction between party leaders and subcommittee chairs to 
scheduling decisions (Deering and Smith 1981). Increases in floor amend-
ments made the final fate of committee-sponsored bills more uncertain than 
before (Sinclair 1983; Bach and Smith 1988). Also, ideological divisions 
within the majority party made final passage of legislation less predictable. 
Leaders addressed these uncertainties by devising ways to maintain party 
harmony and build coalitions on the floor. 
But during the 1980s these tendencies gradually declined, and the latent 
power of centralized party leadership was aroused by unanticipated changes 
in the political landscape and the policy agenda (Davidson 1988b; Dodd 
and Oppenheimer 1989). The 1980s were marked by split party control of 
government; Republicans held firm control of the White House and, for six 
years, the Senate, while Democrats continued to control the House. Ronald 
Reagan's presidential election ignited a conservative fiscal policy movement 
that was simmering since the late 1970s. Reagan's agenda of tax breaks, 
domestic-spending cuts, and large defense-spending increases was expected 
to fix the sluggish economy, balance the budget, and strengthen the military. 
As it turned out, though, these policies exacerbated the deficit problem 
already underway during the Carter years. Annual deficits exploded during 
the 1980s, jumping from about $80 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1981 to $127 
billion a year later to $207 billion by FY 1983. By FY 1986 the deficit 
climaxed at $220 billion. Large deficits placed constraints on new federal 
spending (see Schick 1983). The deficit, combined with increasing homo-
geneity of policy preferences among House Democrats (Rohde 1988), also 
polarized the parties. As Table 6-1 indicates, high levels of party unity on 
roll-call votes for first budget resolutions became the norm by 1983 (see 
Ellwood 1985). 
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Table 6-1 I Party Unity among House Democrats, 1975-1988 
Party Unity on 
Calendar Fiscal Party Annual First Budget Annual 
Year Year Unity" Change Resolutions Change 
Period I 
1975 1976 75 74 
1976 1977 75 0 82 +8 
1977 1978 74 -1 78 -4 
1978 1979 71 -3 76 -2 
1979 1980 75 +4 81 +5 
Period II 
1980 1981 78 +3 77 -4 
1981 1982 75 -3 65 -12 
1982 1983 77 +2 73 +8 
Period III 
1983 1984 82 +5 86 +13 
1984 1985 81 -1 89 +3 
1985 1986 86 +5 94 +5 
1986 1987 86 0 92 -2 
1987 1988 88 +2 92 0 
1988 1989 88 0 90 -2 
a Party unity is the percentage of members voting with a majority of their party when a majority 
of one party is arrayed against a majority of the other party (party unity votes). See Chap-
ter 2. 
Source: Party unity scores from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1990, 199. Party unity scores 
for first budget resolutions compiled by author from data published in Congressional Quar-
terly Almanac 1975-88, vols. 31-44. 
PERIODS OF THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 
An examination of budget policy-making in the context of mstitutional 
reforms, electoral trends, partisan changes, and agenda factors reveals that 
the postreform era evolved through roughly three periods. Period I, the 
decentralized-collegial period (1975-79), consisted of high levels of mem-
ber participation, weak majority party (Democratic) unity, and dwindling 
support for traditional liberal policies. Period II, the decentralized-cen-
tralized period (1980-82), as its label suggests, contained elements of both 
decentralization and centralization. The majority party was still divided, 
and members continued to offer amendments when they could; at the same 
time, though party leaders began to restrict floor amendments to budget 
resolutions, the deficit became a salient issue, and reconciliation procedures 
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Table 6-2 I Leader Activity in the Budget Process during the Three Periods of 
the Postreform Era 
Period 
I. DECENTRALIZED- II. DECENTRALIZED-
COLLEGIAL CENTRALIZED III. CENTRALIZED 
Activity (1975-79) (1980-82) (1983-88) 
Policy formulation Secondary Slightly more Active to very 
activity active active 
Coalition building Very active Very active Secondary 
activity 
Settling differences Inactive More active Active 
with the Senate 
Negotiating with the Inactive Active Active 
president 
were used to reduce the deficit. Period III, the centralized period (1983-
88), was marked by split party control, high levels of party unity, large 
budget deficits, and continued use of restricted rules and reconciliation. Each 
period presented institutional problems that members expected party leaders 
to address or created opportunities for leaders to exploit. 
The tasks of party leaders changed as budget politics evolved from the 
decentralized to a centralized mode. Leaders are potentially involved in four 
stages of the budget process: policy formulation, coalition building, settling 
conference disputes, and negotiating budget agreements with the president. 
Table 6-2 outlines how leaders' tasks evolved during the three periods of 
the postreform era. 
The Decentralized-Collegial Period: 1975-1979 
Under the Budget Act (1974), the House Budget Committee is formally 
responsible for drafting a first budget resolution, which establishes the basic 
guidelines for the authorizations, appropriations, and revenue bills to be 
considered for the upcoming fiscal year. The first resolution includes both 
aggregate estimates (for budget outlays, revenues, annual deficit, and total 
debt) and nineteen separate budget functions (broad categories defined in 
terms of budget priorities, such as defense, education, and the like). In the 
process of formulating budget resolutions, Budget Committee members typi-
cally consider the preferences of the majority party caucus, the president (if 
of the same party as the House majority), or party leaders. Once the com-
mittee's work is complete, the first budget resolution is reported to the floor, 
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where it is normally endorsed by majority party leaders. On the floor, the 
committee's budget resolution is usually subject to amendment or challenge 
by alternative budget resolutions, depending on the floor rules framed by 
the Rules Committee and approved by the House. 
During the decentralized-collegial period, the role played by party lead-
ers in formulating first budget resolutions was limited by several factors. 
First, the reforms aimed mostly toward expanding opportunities for mem-
bers to participate in the legislative process. Rather than state the party's 
priorities outright, party leaders were expected to let members express their 
views on the budget. Second, House Democrats were divided ideologically. 
As Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D-Mass.) indicated, the party actually was 
comprised of "five parties in one. We've got about 25 really strong liberals, 
110 progressive liberals, maybe 60 moderates, about 45 people just to the 
nght of the moderates, and 30 conservatives" (qtd. in Arie££ 1980, 2696). 
Hence, the Speaker was poorly positioned to advocate one set of priorities 
over another. Third, for most of this period, Jimmy Carter was president. 
Even though the Budget Act gave Congress a legitimate claim to challenge 
the executive's budget, many still considered the president to be the leading 
agenda setter for his party in Congress. His presence inhibited party leaders 
from trying to define the party's priorities. 
Because budget resolutions essentially define the priorities of the House 
majority party, leaders-despite these restrictions-had more input into 
budget policy at the Budget Committee level than with other policy issues 
treated by House standing committees (see Sinclair 1981a). Unlike other 
committees, the Budget Committee includes one leader from each of the 
two parties. The majority leader naturally participates in the budget-
formulation process. On one occasion, Speaker O'Neill took a direct role 
in the committee's business; m 1979, the first year members gave serious 
consideration to trimming the budget, O'Neill met with Budget Com-
mittee Democrats and "made an impassioned plea for saving social pro-
grams" (Sinclair 1983, 176). 
Nevertheless, party leaders did not regularly intervene in the committee's 
business in the decentralized-collegial period. Their main job was to help 
the committee pass its resolutions on the floor, a task complicated by mem-
bers' expectations to participate actively in floor debate over budget prior-
ities. Numerous floor amendments on first budget resolutions (LeLoup 
1980) and partisan divisions over budget priorities (Schick 1980) increased 
the uncertainty of gaining approval for the Budget Committee's resolution 
on the House floor. During this period the committee's first budget reso-
lution passed by an average margin of only twenty-eight votes per year (see 
Table 6-3, p. 118), even though Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 
an average of 138 seats. Two particular cases reveal clearly the problem of 
passing budget resolutions on the floor: (1) the Budget Committee's first 
attempt at passing the FY 1978 first budget resolution was rejected by the 
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Table 6-3 I House Roll-call Votes and Margins of Victory for House Budget 
Committee's First Budget Resolutions, 1975-1988 
Party Average Vote 
Calendar Ratio House Vote Margin for 
Year (D-R) (Yea-Nay) Vote Margin Period 
Period I 
1975 291-144 200-196 4 
1976 221-155 66 
1977 292-193 84-320 Rejected 28.8 1977 213-179 34 
1978 201-197 4 
1979 277-158 220-184 36 
Period II 
1980 225-193 32 
1981 242-167 270-154 Republican 32 
1982 219-206 Substitutes 
Period III 
1983 268-167 229-196 33 
1984 250-168 82 
1985 254-179 258-170 88 61.4 1986 245-179 66 
1987 259-174 230-192 38 
1988 319-102 Summit budget 
Source: Compiled by the author from data published in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
1975-88, vols. 31-44. 
House by a vote of 84 to 320, and (2) in 1979 the House rejected the initial 
conference version of the first budget resolution. 
Yet passing budget resolutions is essential to the survival of the congres-
sional budget process. Hence party leaders directed their attention to the 
floor stage of the budget process, where they performed traditional coali-
tion-building and party-maintenance functions. During this period, majority 
party leaders engaged in numerous vote-gathering activities: they provided 
more services to members, expanded the whip system, and set up task forces 
designed to build party support for first budget resolutions (Sinclair 1981b, 
1983). 
It was appropriate for majority party leaders to concentrate on tasks 
aimed toward resolving problems within the House. Leaders had tradition-
ally engaged in coalition building; now they were needed to ensure that 
Congress fulfilled its responsibility to pass a budget. To be sure, there were 
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problems outside of the House as well. House Democrats frequently disa-
greed with President Carter's fiscal policy, and House and Senate Democrats 
differed over the proper balance of defense versus domestic spending. But 
because there were no protracted disputes between the two chambers, the 
House and Senate budget committee chairs could be counted on to settle 
differences between the chambers. Once these differences were settled, party 
leaders concentrated on maintaining the coalition that approved the House's 
version of the budget resolution. 
The Decentralized-Centralized Period: 1980-1982 
The deficit problem in 1980 led to the first steps toward centralizing power 
in the hands of party leaders. Alarmed by rising inflation, unemployment, 
and interest rates, Carter administration officials met with congressional 
budget policymakers to discuss ways of curbing the growing federal deficit. 
Although Budget Committee Chair Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) was the 
leading representative of the House Democratic party, Majority Leader Jim 
Wright (D-Tex.) participated in the first presidential-congressional summit 
meeting, held in late February and early March of 1980. During the Ninety-
seventh Congress (1981-82), split party control of government complicated 
the deficit problem and propelled party leaders into more active negotiations 
with the president. But because ideological differences among House Dem-
ocrats persisted, party leaders continued to contend with the internal prob-
lems of party maintenance and coalition building. Member expectations for 
party leaders were shaped by both decentralizing and centralizing forces. 
Budget Policy Formulation Conflicts among House Democrats con-
tinued to limit leaders' input into first budget resolutions. Speaker O'Neill 
sat on the sidelines during the summit meetings in 1980. He withheld sup-
port for the summit agreement reached by Carter officials and congressional 
leaders, which contained reconciliation instructions to reduce spending by 
$6.4 billion. O'Neill objected that the cuts would "dismantle the programs 
I've been working for as an old liberal" (qtd. in Gregg 1980, 641). 
In the following year, conditions continued to thwart O'Neill's role in 
formulating the House budget resolution. Reagan's 1980 electoral victory 
made O'Neill the opposition party leader, but it also carried a conservative 
fiscal policy message that moved the House Democratic party further away 
from the traditional liberal agenda O'Neill championed. Republicans had 
picked up thirty-four House seats and won a majority in the Senate for the 
first time since 1952. Conservative southern Democrats formed the Con-
servative Democratic Forum (CDF) and pushed Speaker O'Neill to appoint 
more conservatives to the House Budget Committee. Under these conditions, 
O'Neill deferred to committee Democrats, led by conservative chair James 
R. Jones (D-Okla.), to draft a moderate alternative to Reagan's budget. 
Speaker O'Neill's heaviest participation in formulating a budget reso-
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lution came in 1982, in response to a minor crisis in the budget process. 
The House initially rejected all eight budget resolutions voted on the floor, 
including the original package offered by the Budget Committee. The com-
mittee went back to the drawing board to formulate another budget res-
olution. The prospect of failing to approve a budget gave O'Neill a chance 
to put his mark on the first budget resolution. He commissioned the Steering 
and Policy Committee to draft a "true Democratic budget," including spend-
ing increases for housing, jobs, unemployment compensation, Medicare, 
and education. This budget marked the Speaker's first attempt at an active 
role in formulating a first budget resolution. 
Passing Budget Resolutions The primary task of party leaders during 
this period, however, was to build support for resolutions drafted by the 
Budget Committee. The heavy amending activity of the collegial-decen-
tralized period was curtailed somewhat by the deficit problem. Party leaders 
issued complex rules for floor debate, including restrictions on the number 
of amendments members could offer (Bach and Smith 1988). But party 
leaders continued to struggle to satisfy the conflicting priorities of conserv-
ative and liberal Democrats. In the Ninety-seventh Congress (1981-82), a 
coalition of conservative Democrats and minority party Republicans took 
control of the House. floor. 
In 1980 the House approved the Budget Committee's first budget res-
olution (which incorporated the elements of the presidential-congressional 
summit agreement) by a vote of 225 to 193. But the House-passed resolution 
fell apart in conference as Senate Budget Committee Chair Ernest F. Hollings 
(D-S.C.) pressed to increase defense spending. Several House Democratic 
conferees refused to endorse the conference report, and both O'Neill and 
Carter disapproved the measure. The House defeated the conference version 
of the resolution by a vote of 141 to 245. 
However, after Giaimo, Hollings, and Carter resolved the major issues 
dividing the party, Speaker O'Neill fully supported the revised conference 
report. He mobilized the support of the Steering and Policy Committee 
Democrats and the party whips, and he appointed a task force to build 
support for the conference budget resolution (Sinclair 1983, 186-88). 
O'Neill dispatched a letter to House Democrats that reflected his duties to 
address institutional problems and advance party interests. "Failure to adopt 
the first resolution," he warned, "would demonstrate clearly that the Dem-
ocratic Congress cannot deal with the budget. It would discredit the party 
and the Congress" (qtd. in Sinclair 1983, 187). The House approved the 
conference report on a 237 to 161 vote, with only twelve Democrats voting 
nay. 
During the first two years of the Reagan administration, Democratic 
party leaders tried numerous coalition-building strategies to offset the con-
servative movement (Sinclair 1983; Smith 1982). They offered amendments 
to attract conservative Democrats, mobilized interest group support, and 
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made personal appeals to party unity. Their efforts failed, however, in both 
1981 and 1982. In 1981 President Reagan rode the wave of his electoral 
victory to gain congressional approval for a first budget resolution-a rec-
onciliation bill including unprecedented spending cuts and a three-year plan 
to reduce taxes. Combining his personal popularity, persuasive bargaining 
skills, and an effective White House staff, Reagan executed a vote-gathering 
drive that overwhelmed Democratic leaders. 
In 1982 the Rules Committee crafted a rule that allowed sixty-eight 
floor amendments and seven substitutes to the Budget Committee's first 
budget resolution. The rule included a king-of-the-mountain feature-it es-
tablished the voting order for amendments and substitutes and decreed that 
the last budget resolution to receive a maiority vote would be declared the 
House-passed resolution. Naturally, the Rules Committee placed the Budget 
Committee's resolution last in order. After the seven substitutes were re-
jected, O'Neill spoke in favor of the committee's resolution, urging the 
House to perform its duty and pass the budget. But the House rejected the 
committee's resolution by a vote of 159 to 265. The unsuccessful first round 
gave way to O'Neill's "true Democratic budget," which the House also 
rejected by a vote of 202 to 225. Finally, the House passed a Republican 
budget alternative for the second consecutive year. Despite their efforts, 
party leaders were unable to perform effectively even their most fundamental 
tasks. 
Presidential-Congressional Relations In the context of split party con-
trol and growing deficits, the Speaker participated actively in policy-related 
tasks outside of the House. Budget Chair Jones defined the expectations of 
the speaker's role as opposition party leader: 
The Speaker is the lightning rod, the chief spokesman. He is the one who pre-
dominantly has to draw the lines of difference between the [Reagan] adminis-
tration's policies and the House. Because the budget is the guts of government, 
the heart and soul of government. And, how it is configured shapes the differ-
ences in the [Democratic] party's view toward the country. (Interview, 13 Feb-
ruary 1989) 
As chief spokesperson for the majority party, Speaker O'Neill repre-
sented the policy interests of the House maiority party in budget negotiations 
with the president. In 1981, of course, President Reagan bypassed Demo-
cratic leaders altogether and took advantage of favorable conditions to push 
his budget package through Congress. But when the deficit became the core 
issue of budget politics, the two parties became locked in continual stalemate 
over budget priorities. Bipartisan summit meetings involving the president 
and party leaders became the primary means of trying to break the stalemate 
and negotiate ways to reduce the deficit. 
The need for a principal majority party spokesperson became clear as 
early as 1982. Reagan's budget for the upcoming fiscal year was tagged 
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"dead on arrival" on Capitol Hill. But neither Senate Republican nor House 
Democratic budget makers, acting alone, could devise an adequate substi-
tute to reduce the menacing deficit. The two parties came together at the 
so-called "Gang of Seventeen" meetings, comprising seventeen high-level 
White House officials and congressional leaders. Behind closed doors, the 
group made progress toward an agreement. But no bargains could be struck 
without the consent of the president and the Speaker. Senate Budget Com-
mittee Chair Pete V. Domenici (R-N.Mex.), a leading participant in the 
meetings, noted that a budget agreement could be reached "if we can get 
both Speaker Tip O'Neill and the president on board" (qtd. in Tate 1982, 
787). But Reagan was unwilling to raise taxes in the midst of a recession, 
and O'Neill refused to reduce Social Security benefits. With the two leaders 
reluctant to budge, the meetings ended in stalemate. 
Soon after the Gang of Seventeen meetings broke up, Reagan invited 
O'Neill to the White House for a one-on-one meeting. The two haggled 
over ideological differences-Reagan argued in favor of conservative fiscal 
philosophy, while O'Neill cited the virtues of the New Deal and Great 
Society programs. Even though this meeting also ended in deadlock, it sym-
bolized a new task for the Speaker-as opposition party leader, representing 
House Democrats in negotiations with the president. 
Later in 1982 the Speaker and the president reached a rare compromise 
on a $98 billion tax-increase bill crafted by O'Neill, Senate Majority Leader 
Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), and Senate Finance Chair Bob Dole (R-
Kans.). The Speaker was thus established as a key player in negotiations 
over major policy decisions with the Senate and the White House. 
The Period of Centralization: 1983-1988 
The pattern of centralized leadership that emerged during the 1980s was 
encouraged by the continuation of divided government combined with 
growing deficits and increasing party cohesion. Reconciliation procedures 
used to reduce the deficit required leaders to play a more active role in 
coordinating the committees. 
The Rules Committee continued to restrict amendments to first budget 
resolutions (Bach and Smith 1988). The deficits squeezed new spending 
initiatives and increased partisan conflict, creating stalemate over budget 
priorities. Yet the two parties were forced to the bargaining table, first by 
the concern for deficits, then by the threat of automatic spending cuts in 
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit-reduction law. Budget summit 
meetings thus became vehicles for trying to resolve fundamental policy dif-
ferences, with House Democrats relying on party leaders to negotiate with 
Republican Senate leaders and White House officials. The same centralizing 
conditions that encouraged party leaders to perform more policy-related 
tasks also reduced the need for leaders to concentrate their efforts on tra-
ditional coalition-building and party-maintenance functions. 
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Policy Formulation High levels of party unity are typically reflected 
in more homogenous preferences among party members, allowing leaders 
to exercise stronger party leadership (Rohde and Shepsle 1987). By 1982 
Speaker O'Neill was taking a more active role in formulating the priorities 
of the House Democratic party. But his actions sprang in large part from 
the House's failure to pass a budget resolution. Weak party cohesion limited 
O'Neill's capacity to initiate priorities on behalf of the Democratic party. 
After the Democrats regained twenty-six House seats in the 1982 midterm 
elections, however, O'Neill was better positioned to lead the party. Backed 
by a unified party (see Table 6-1, p. 115), the Speaker participated more 
actively than ever before in formulating Democratic budget priorities. 
The most impressive example of active policy-oriented leadership came 
in 1987 from Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.) (Sinclair 1989b). A former mem-
ber of the Budget Committee, Wright established his priorities almost im-
mediately after being elected Speaker in December 1986. At his first press 
conference, Wright announced that the Democratic party should propose 
a tax-revenue increase for higher-income earners. When the lOOth Congress 
convened in January 1987, the new Speaker submitted a detailed list of 
initiatives that he believed the Budget Committee should include in its first 
budget resolution for the upcoming fiscal year. Wright's priorities included 
spending increases for welfare programs, health care, assistance for the 
homeless, relief for AIDS victims, drug prevention, and federal job training. 
He proceeded to lobby Democratic caucus and Budget Committee members 
to support the tax increase and the new spending initiatives. Ultimately, the 
House Budget Committee endorsed, and the House approved, a first budget 
resolution encompassing Wright's agenda. 
Wright's ability to define the majority party's priorities indicated how 
far the Speaker's policy-making tasks had evolved since the creation of the 
budget process in 1974. For years a divided House Democratic party pro-
hibited the Speaker from participating actively in formulating the House 
Budget; the Speaker's job was to mediate interests, not to define policies. 
With the party more unified, especially in terms of budget matters, Speaker 
O'Neill was able to take a more active role in stating his preferences. But 
Wright was even more willing and able than O'Neill to take advantage of 
the conditions that upheld policy-oriented leadership. 
Passing Budget Resolutions The same conditions that permitted the 
Speaker to play a more active role in formulating budget resolutions also 
removed obstacles to floor passage. As the House Democrats' budgetary 
preferences became more homogenous, party leaders spent far less time and 
effort on coalition building and party maintenance. Leaders used the Rules 
Committee more aggressively to prohibit amendments on the floor and to 
manage the uncertainty of passing legislation (Bach and Smith 1988). The 
closed rules marked a shift from the wide-open collegial process of the 1970s 
toward the centralized leadership of the 1980s. 
124 I DANIELJ,PALAZZOLO 
One way to measure the predictability of passing budget resolutions on 
the floor is to examine the margins of victory or defeat on the Budget 
Committee's first budget resolutions. As Table 6-3 shows, from 1983 to 
1988 the Budget Committee's first budget resolutions were approved by 
impressive margins in comparison with previous years. Armed with strong 
party unity and restrictive rules for floor debate, leaders had little trouble 
passing the committee's first budget resolutions. The Speaker made less use 
of task forces and the whip system to build partisan support for budget 
resolutions. Instead, the Speaker's emphasis shifted to policy-oriented ac-
tivities. 
Settling Conference Disputes Ever since the creation of a congressional 
budget process, the Senate and the House have supported different budget 
priorities, even when Democrats controlled both chambers. House budgets 
normally contained lower defense spending and higher figures for domestic 
programs than the Senate preferred. These differences were usually resolved 
in conference by members of the two budget committees, with little inter-
vention by party leaders. However, between 1981and1986, when Repub-
licans controlled the Senate, the gap between the parties was at times too 
wide to be bridged through normal conference committee proceedings. Bi-
cameral deadlocks were so prolonged in 1984 and 1985 that the Speaker 
was called on to negotiate agreements with Republican Senate leaders and 
the president. 
In 1984 conferees fought over a wide gap between each chamber's pro-
posals for total defense and domestic spending. On the one hand, the Senate 
backed a Reagan-endorsed plan to place caps, or ceilings, on spending levels 
that would pare defense spending by $41 billion and domestic spending by 
$43 billion over a three-year period. The House budget, on the other hand, 
reduced defense spending by $95 billion and domestic expenditures by only 
$15 billion over three years. As the conference talks began, Speaker O'Neill 
announced, "We absolutely will not go along" with the Senate's plan (qtd. 
in Tate 1984, 1295). 
The opposing sides were deadlocked until Congress was forced to pass 
a debt-limit increase bill on 28 June 1984. Conferees agreed to a partial 
deficit-reduction reconciliation bill that increased revenues by $50 billion 
and reduced domestic spending by $13 billion. But because the defense issue 
remained unsettled, conferees failed to complete the first budget resolution. 
The impasse lasted until O'Neill met privately with Senate Majority Leader 
Baker during the final two weeks of September. The two leaders agreed on 
Baker's proposal to delay a vote on appropriations for the MX missile until 
the spring of 1985, in exchange for O'Neill's commitment to support the 
Senate's overall defense figure for FY 1985. With this issue decided, the 
conferees quickly finished their business and the two chambers approved 
the conference report on 1 October 1984. 
In 1985 conferees haggled over a Senate proposal, also endorsed by 
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President Reagan, to freeze cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social 
Security benefits. "I am bitterly opposed [to capping the COLAs)," Speaker 
O'Neill sharply announced, "and I will so notify and instruct my conferees" 
(qtd. in Calmes 1985, 971). After seven weeks of stalemate, President Re-
agan intervened. He invited Speaker O'Neill to the White House, along with 
Majority Leader Wright, House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.), 
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, and Senate Minority Leader Robert C. 
Byrd (D-W.Va.). At that meeting, Reagan dropped the Senate initiative to 
freeze COLAs for Social Security, and he and O'Neill agreed to a budget 
package that would increase the House defense figure, freeze tax increases, 
and reduce other domestic programs. 
The compromises reached by the Speaker and the president were at first 
resisted by many Senate Republicans and House Democrats. Senate Re-
publicans criticized the president for abandoning the freeze on Social Se-
curity COLAs; House Democrats balked at some of the proposed domestic 
spending cuts. The differences were finally ironed out in private meetings 
that included the two Budget Committee chairs, Representative William H. 
Gray (D-Pa.) and Senator Domenici (R-N.Mex.), and the committee's rank-
ing minority party members, Representative Delbert L. Latta (R-Ohio) and 
Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.). The group endorsed a budget resolution 
that incorporated the major points of the deficit-reduction package endorsed 
by Reagan and O'Neill. The conference budget resolution was finally ap-
proved by both chambers. 
Presidential-Congressional Relations As the preceding example indi-
cates, meetings between the president and House leaders were essential to 
resolving budgetary disagreements during the period of centralized decision 
making. Speaker O'Neill met with President Reagan on several occasions 
either to discuss the broad outlines of the budget or to consider ways of 
reducing the deficit. For the most part, the two leaders bargained over na-
tional priorities under the constraints of large deficits. Reagan advocated 
large defense expenditures, while O'Neill sought to protect traditional lib-
eral programs. More often than not, their meetings failed to produce an 
agreement. Although Reagan and O'Neill were recognized as the leaders of 
their parties, neither was able to build a consistent, loyal following. Their 
positions indicated the peculiar nature of leadership during a period of 
stalemate. As Aaron Wildavsky put it: 
President Reagan and Speaker O'Neill, the elder statesmen, serve as lodestars; 
their agreement gives permission to people on their right and left respectively 
to follow suit. But by refusing permission the president and the Speaker are 
better at stopping what they don't like than in getting what they want because, 
like other would-be leaders, they lack majorities. (1988, 207) 
Thus the Speaker's main task was to accept or reject budget proposals on 
behalf of the Democratic party. 
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One of the most memorable budget summits occurred after the stock-
market crash of October 1987. The president and Congress were compelled 
by the situation to consider ways to reduce the deficit. The summit meetings 
involved key White House officials, party leaders, and chairs of the budget, 
appropriations, and tax committees. Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-
Wash.) was the leading representative for the House Democratic party. 
Although Speaker Wright and President Reagan did not participate directly 
in the summit, the fate of the meetings rested on the consent of the two 
leaders. Their disagreement partly explains why it took over a month to 
reach a summit agreement. As one House Democrat said, "You've got two 
exceedingly inflexible men, Wright and Reagan" (qtd. in Wehr 1987, 2707). 
The stalemate finally broke under the threat of a sequester-automatic 
spending cuts necessary to meet the requirements of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings law. The participants approved a two-year deficit-reduction plan 
with $30 billion in savings for FY 1988 and $46 billion for FY 1989. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the conditions that shaped the postreform period in Congress, 
party leaders now perform a wider variety of functions. Coalition-building 
and party-maintenance tasks continue to be critical to the internal workings 
of the House. It was natural for leaders to continue to execute these tasks 
in response to the problems arising in the decentralized, participatory mood 
of the immediate postreform period. 
However, party leaders need not be restricted to such traditional func-
tions. This is attested by the wider range of leaders' activities in the cen-
tralized context of the 1980s-especially their participation in formulating 
budget priorities, settling conference disputes, and negotiating budget meet-
ings with the president. Members expect leaders to adapt, as the institution 
itself must, to changes in the policy agenda and the political environment. 
Divided government, a contracted agenda, and intense partisanship posed 
a new and different set of conditions. These conditions, in turn, encouraged 
party leaders to assume policy-oriented functions both within and outside 
of the House. In general, then, the functions of party leaders tend to reflect 
the problems and opportunities encountered by Congress itself. 
